University of California, Hastings College of the Law

UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Opinions

The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection

11-6-1946

The People v. Hilton
Roger J. Traynor

Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions
Recommended Citation
Roger J. Traynor, The People v. Hilton 29 Cal.2d 217 (1946).
Available at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions/224

This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Opinions by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.

771.fi-A
Nov. 1946]

217

PEoPLE 1J. HILTON
[29 C.2d 217; 1'4 P.2d 5)

tCrim. No. 4725. In Bank. Nov•

.s, 1948.]

THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. THOMAS HILTON,
Appellant.
[1] Homicide-Appeal-llarmless and BeverslDle Brror-Instractions.-In a homicide case in which the uncontradicted evidence showed the crime committed to have been that of murder of the first degree, defendant was not prejudiced by instructions defining the degrees of murder, their respective
elements, and the burden of proof thereon, and a judgment
of conviction of first degree murder was aftlnned.

APPEAL from a judgment (automatically taken under
Pen. Code, § 1239) of the Superior Court of Santa Barbara
County. Atwell Westwick, Judge. Affirmed.
Prosecution for murder. Judgment of conviction affirmed.
George Finucane and Gene Harris for Appellant.
Robert W. Kenny, Attorney General, Frank Richards, Deputy Attorney General, Lawrence M. Parma, District Attorney,
David S. Licker, Assistant District Attorney, and Thomas P.
Weldon. Deputy Distriet Attorney, for Respondent.

SPENCE, J.-Defendant was convicted of first degree
murder and was sentenced to pay the extreme penalty. Prior
to the trial, defendant had withdrawn his plea of not guilty by
reason of insanity. This appeal is automatie in pursoance of
section 1239 (b) of the Penal Code.
[1] The commission of the murder was admitted by defendant. At the trial his confession was introduced in evidence.
He did not take the witness stand in his own behalf, and he
offered no defense. However, defendant claims that he was
prejudiced by certain instructions given by the trial court
defining the degrees of murder, their respective elements, and
the burden of proof thereon. The challenged instructions are
substantially the .same as those which were condemned in the
recent cases of People v. Thomas,25 Cal.2d 880 [156 P.2d 7];
People v. Bender, 27 Ca1.2d 164 fI6S P.2d 8]; and People v.
[1] See 8 Oal.Jur. 628; S Am.Jur. 622.
Kelt. Die. Reference: [1] Homicide, § 261.
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Valentine, 28 Cal.2d 121 [169 P.2d 1]. But here, contrary
to the situation in the cited eases, the evidenee, including defendant's confession, stands uncontradicted and leaves no
doubt whatever that the murder committed by defendant was
murder of the 1irst degree. Under these circumstanees the
verdict must be upheld pursuant to the constitutional mandate
requiring that a judgment shall not be reversed because of
the jury's misdirection "unless, after an examination of the
entire ease, including the evidence, the court shall be of the
opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice." (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 41h.)
Defendant, a native of Santa Maria, is 29 years of age. He
is unmarried, having been divorced from his former wife.
He is a high school graduate and a truck driver by occupation.
Sue Fouts, the deceased victim, was a happily married
woman 41 years of age and a resident of Corcoran in Kings
County. She traveled to Santa 'Maria on Deeember 2, 1945,
for the purpose of caring for her mother, Mrs. Swearingen,
who was 73 years of age and in ill health. About 5:30 p. m.
on December 5, Mrs. Fouts' nephew, Allan Stewart, brought
defendant to the Swearingen home for dinner and introduced
him to Mrs. Fouts. Stewart and defendant had been together
in theaftemoon and had had BOrne drinks.
Following dinner in the Swearingen home, Mrs. Fouts,
Stewart and defendant went downtown and each had a highball. After they returned to the Swearingen home, Stewart
left, aaying that he thought he would go back downtown for
a short time. About 8 o'clock in the evening Mrs. Fouts and
defendant decided to return to the downtown section of Santa
Maria and look for Stewart. When they arrived downtown,
defendant, without authority to do BO, secured the truck of his
employer from a service station where it had been left for
repairs. He and Mrs. Fouts· rode about town and had a few
drinks. About midnight they went to the Chew Cafe in Santa
Maria, where Mrs. Fouts had some Chinese food and defendant
drank some beer.
The evideneeas to what transpired between that time and
the time of the murder is found in defendant's confession,
made on December 13 to the deputy district attorney. That
confession was made in the presence of, and was transcribed
by, a shorthand reporter who testified at the trial. Defendant
stated that after leaving the Chinese cafe he drove Mrs. Fouts
to the Rosemary F&l'Dl on the outskirts of Santa Maria. There
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they stopped and talked about "juke box" records "and
things." Then defendant drove on "a little ways" and again
turned off the highway and stopped the truck. Previously
he had told Mrs. Fouts that she should drive, and had said
to her, "1 ought to take you out and cut your throat." She
had laughed, thinking that he was joking. After stopping
the truck, defendant got out, walked around the side, and
told Mrs. Fouts to move into the driver's seat. As she started
to move over. defendant stabbed her in the throat with his
pocket knife. She gasped; he stabbed "two or three times";
and her body fell forward and partially out of the truck.
Defendant said that he left the body lying upon the ground
and proceeded to walk around the ranch for approximately
half an hour. Then he returned to the truck, placed the body
in it, and drove down the road to the home of one Jack Siler.
He awoke Siler and requested the loan of a shotgun for duck
hunting. Siler said that he did not have the gun. Defendant
then proceeded to the home of one Tapscott in Santa Maria,
with intent, 80 he mated, of there securing a gun to kill his
ex-wife. Tapscott was not home. Defendant next drove out
what is known as the Cuyama-Santa MRria Highway, a winding, narrow, mountainous road, which waR familiar to him.
At the wide..<rt point on this road he stopped, took the body
from the truck, and deposited it down the side of a hill about
300 feet off the hiQhw3Y. He returned to the truck, and then
decided to go back'and disrobe the body so as to make its identification "a little slower." He proceeded to do this, and then
drove on toward Bakersfield. He stopped at the first river
crossing. where he threw hh~ victim's clothes off the bridge.
Subsequently some of the articles of clothing were recovered
from th(> river by a searching party from the sheriff's office.
Along the road defendant stopped at a service station in
McKittrick. wher(> he tried to c1ean his clothes. He then continued on to Bakersfield. wh(>re hiR truck ran out of gasoline
and he abandoned it on a Ride road. It was discovered there
several daYR later by a deputy sheriff. The cab on the inside
was covered with bloodstains. On the floor there was a small
hand axe covered with bloodstains and traces of hair like that
of Mrs. Fou!."! were found adhering to it.
From Bakersfield defendant hitch-hiked to Trona, where his
ex-wife lived. His prime purpose was to kill her. He stayed
around Trona for a few days and burglarized several houses
in an attempt to find a gun with which to kill his ex-wife .
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He did not succeed in securing one or in finding her. He then
hitch-hiked to Lone Pine. He assaulted one man who gave
him a ride, striking the man's head with a bar of metal. He
attempted to commit suicide, using the same knife with which
he had killed Mrs. Fouts, but he slashed his wrists too high to
have a fatal efrect. He was arrested by a deputy sheriff at
Lone Pine, Inyo County.
Defendant said that he had no reason to kill Mrs. Fouts,
and he denied that there had been any semaJ. relations between
them or any advances on his part. Whether there had been
sexual relations could not be proved because of the extended
time the body had remained exposed on the mountainside b&fore it was discovered. Defendant stated that the Uquor he
drank did not affect him. He further stated as follows:
"Q. When did you make up your mind to kill hert A. About
a couple hours before then. Q. While she was up at her housc~
A. No, it was when we were coming down town. Q. What caused
you to decide to kill her' A. Oh, I got to thinking. Q. Thinking
about what' A. I don't know if this is all necessary on this
case or not. Q. Well, we would like to mow if you could tell
us. A. I have it all in my other confession. Q. Youean go ahead
and tell us that. A. I had a lot of trouble with my wife; she
is my ex-wife, and she has been bothering me for quite awhile.
Q. Did you tell Sue Fouts about your trouble with your wife'
A. Yes, quite a bit of it. Q. What did Mrs. Fouts ten 1011'
A. She just more or less said it was trifl.in.g. Q. Did she tell
you to go back to your wife' A. No, just to forget it-flhe told
me not to let it bother me. Q. Did that cause you to get mad i
nt her' A. Oh, I had been thinking for a couple weeks-I been '
thinking for a year of killing my wife. Q. Why were you mad
at your wife' A. She had me arrested ten times. Q_ For
what' A. Five times on disturbing the peace charges, one drunk,
one kidnapping, one rape, one insanity, and one simple assault.
Q. Where did all this happen' A. In Trona. . . . Q. Who did
.\·ou commit this rape on' A. I didn't; I was acquitted of the
~harge. She brought all these charges at di1rerent intervals. ,
Q. This insanity-what was that' A. She tried to have me i,
committed to Patton. I was adjudged sane. Q. You were adjudged sane and they turned you loose; is that true' A. Yes.
. . • Q. Getting back to Mrs. Fouts, how long had you known
Mrs. Fouts' A. Probably five or six houl'S. Q. Was Wednesday,
the 5th of December, 1945, the first day you met her' A. Yes.
Q. That was the first time in your life that you had ever seen
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her; is that true! A. Yes. Q. When did you make up your
mind to kill her! A. Subconsciously maybe when I was walking down from the house. Q. What caused you to get that idea
in your mind, that you wanted to kill her. A. I always regretted I had not kil1ed my wife when I had the opportunity;
I was all mixed up. Q. Mrs. Fouts never said anything or did
anything to you, and you had only met her four or five hours
before? A. Yea.... Q. Did Mrs. Fouts say anything to you when
you stabbed her' A. She gasped.... Q. As a matter of fact,
she didn't know you were going to stab her' A. No. . • .
Q. When you left the Swearingen house with Sue Fouts what
did you tell her you were going to do' A. I don't know. We
were both feeling good and were going to go down and look
for Allan; he had left early. Q. When you left the house did
you intend at that time to kill her' A. Subconsciously; it might
have been in the back of my mind. Q. You definitely made up
:vour mind about 9 :30 at one of these bars' A. When I got the
truck, yes. Q. Did you decide where you were going to kill
her-at what place' A. Yes. Q. When you started drivin~
out on East Main Street to the Rosemary Fann you deflnitel~·
made up your mind you were going to kill her. Is that true~
A. Yea.... Q. Just how much did you have to drink that nigh1
before you killed Sue Fouts' A. I started drinking abol1t
nine o'clock that day. Q. But you knew what you were doing
all the time' A. Yes. Q. You weren't drunk.A. No. Q. And
you weren't drunk when you killed her' A. No. Q. You knew
what you were doing! A. Yea. Q. What reason did you have'
.Tust tell us the reason, Mr. Hilton, why you killed her. Just
tell us in your own words what the reason was. A. Like t said.
I knew for a year, I definitely planned to kill my wife. I had
it in my mind this Fall; it was always in my mind, and it kept
getting later and later and I kept thinking about it; that':-;
an I know, and I know that that day, why, it was on my mine'!
all the time, Q. It is true that when you start drinking you ge~
an inclination to kill some one' A. No, it has always been m~'
wife I wanted to kill. Q. You do get that idea when drinkinr.?
A. It's worse when I drink.••• I had been drinking all day,
and I was thinking I ought to get that gun, borrow one from
Tap or Bome one on the pretext of going hunting."
In view of the constitutional mandate (art. VI, § 41h), the
foregoing uncontradicted evidence must be borne in mind in
considering defendant's sole contention on this appeal, which
. II that "The trial court erred to the prejudice of defendant

t22
in instructing the jury relative to the elements of the two
degrees of murder and the burden of proof thereon." It would
serve no useful purpose to set forth the challenged instructions
for, as above indicated, said instructions were substantially
the same as those which were discussed and were held to be
erroneous in P60ple v. 'l'homas, 25 Ca1.2d 880 [156 P.2d 7];
People v. Bender, 27 Cal.2d 164 [163 P.2d 8J; and P60ple 'V.
Valentine,28 Ca1.2d 121 [169 P.2d IJ. It therefore appears
that the giving of the challenged instructions constituted error,
and we turn to the question of whether the error should be
held to be prejudicial.
Defendant concedes that "the crime stood admitted and the
malice aforethought was unchallenged" and he further eoncedes that the evidence "was suftleient to sustain a verdict of
murder in the first degree." As we view the record, however,
there were many other facts which stood admitted and unchallenged, which last mentioned facts pointed unerringly to
and impelled the conclusion that the murder was murder of
the first degree. Thus it appears that it was some time after
midnight on the night in question that defendant committed
a brutal, unprovoked murder of a woman he had known but a
few hours. Despite some drinking, defendant admitted that he
was not "drunk" and that he "knew what [he was1 doing all
the time." With respect to the aetnal killing, the evidence is
summarized in defendant's brief where it is stated: "The
accused herein admitted uneontradietedly that he determined
to kill the decedent and walked around to her side of the car
with that specific intent!' It is therefore clear that the uncontradicted evidence showed that the killing was "willful"
as the stabbing was done with the specific intent to kill the
deceased. But in P60ple v. Bender, I'Upra, 27 Cal.2d 164, at
page 181, this court pointed out that "it is obvious that the
mere intent to kill is not the equivalent of a deliberate and
premeditated intent to kill"; and in P60ple v. 'l'hofn.M, I'Upra,
25 Cal.2d 880, at page 901, it was stated that "The word 'drliberate' is an antonym of 'Hasty, impetuous, rash, impulsiv{"
(Webster's New Int. Diet. (2d ed.» and no act or intent can
truly be said to be 'premeditated' unless it has been the subject of actual deliberation or forethought (id.)" The question
therefore remains as to whether the uncontradicted evidence
showed that the murder was "deliberate, and premeditated"
within the meaning of our statute defining murder of the first
degree (Pen. Code, § 189). Here again the evidence is clear
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and uncontradicted and leaves no room for doubt. While the
actual killing occurred some time after midnight, defendant
admitted that he had "definitely made up [his] mind about
9 :30" to kill Mrs. Fout.s "when [he] got the truck"; and
further that "subconsciously" that intention "might have
been in the back of fhis] mind" when he and Mrs. Fouts left
the Swearingen home about 8 o'clock that evening. Be further
admitted that before leaving Sant.a Maria, he had determined
upon the place where he would carry out his nefarious plan
and that he had thereafter drh'en to that place. Manifestly,
the killing had been the subject of actual and prolonged deliberation and forethought by defendant, the speeifie intent to
kill the deceased having been formed about three hours before
the actual killing and having been adhered to throughout the
intervening time. Under these circumstances, the killing could
not be regarded otherwise than as an act that was "willful,
deliberate, and premeditated." (Pen. Code, § 189.) A.. we
view the uncontradicted evidence presented, the jury could
not properly have arrived at any verdict other than a verdict
finding defendant guilty of murder of the first degree, and
the only real question presented for the jury's determination
was that of the penalty to be imposed. We therefore conclude
that the error in the challenged instructions, dealing with the
subject of the degrees of the murder, may not be treated as
prejudicial.
The foregoing conclusion is not in conflict with the deeisiODB
in the Thomas, Bender, and Valentine cases cited above and
is in line with our recent decision in People v. Bef"Mrtl, 18
Ca1.2d 207 [169 P.2d 636], where substantially similar tD·
structions were given but were held not to have been prejudi·
cial. In that case it was shown without conflict that the 1tilliDI
was committed in the perpetration of a robbery and by rneaJlll
of lying in wait. There, as here, the undisputed faets showed
that the murder was murder of the first degree (Pen. Code,
§ 189). It therefore appears appropriate to conclude h.-e
with the concluding language found in the Bernard ease at
page 214: " .•. Where the facts impel a conviction of mur.
der of the first degree ... and do not admit upon any view of
the evidence of a finding other than of murder of the first de.
gree. there is no occasion whatsoever to give instructions ~
to the differences between the degrees of murder. Bence.
although the instructions as to such· differences were mani.
festly erroneous, the errors cannot have prejudiced the appeal-
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ing defendant." (See, also, PeopZ6 v. PetersOfl, onte, p. 69
[173 P.2d 11]; People v.Honeycutt, onte, p. 52 [172 P.2d
698]; Peopl, v. DortntJ'" 28 Cal.2d 846 [172 P.2d 686].)
The judgment is afIlrmed.

Gibson, C. J., and Shenk, J. eoneurrec1.
EDMONDS, J.-As I read the record in this ease, the chal. i
lenged instructions did not prejudice the defendant and, for
that reason, I coneur in the aftlrmance of the judgment.
CARTER, J.-l dissent.
It is an unwarranted invasion of the province of the jury
to hold that defendant was not prejudiced by the erroneous
charge merely because, in the opinion of a majority of this
court, the evidence "leaves no doubt whatever that the murder
committed by defendant was murder of the first degree." The
fact that concededly the evidence "was sufficient to sustain a
verdict of murder in the first degree" is beside the point.
Whether upon that evidence defendant should have been adjudged guilty of first degree murder or of a lesser crime, or
acquitted, was for the jury and the jury alone to say. It is
not within the power of a trial court, even upon uncontradicted evidence, to direct a verdict of guilty in a criminal
case, nor is it within the power of an appellate court to direct
such a verdict by indirection. Yet the majority opinion does
just that in its conclusion that" As we view the uncontradicted
evidence presented, the jury could not properly have arrived
at any verdict other than a verdict finding defendant guilty
of murder of the first degree, and the only real question presented for the jury's determination was that of the penalty to
bc imposed. We therefore conclude that the error in the challenged instructions, dealing with the subject of the degrees of
the murder, may not be treated as prejudicial."
Defendant's uncontradicted account of the manner in which
the killing occurred left for determination by the jury but
one real issue (other than punishment), and it was upon that
issue, deliberation and premeditation, that the utterly confusing and erroneous instructions had bearing. The effect of
the erroneous charge was therefore to take from the jurors
the one matter to be determined by them. In other words, '.
the
facts showed
that defendant's
crime
murder undisputed
of the first degree,
if his sp'ecific
intent to kill
thewas
deceased

'\'•~."
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was earried out with deliberation and premeditation. Whether
these latter elements were present was the vital question for
the jury under proper instructions. If the jurors were to be
instructed in a vein which emphasized the rapidity with which
thoughts may follow each other, fairness required a further
instruction placing at least equal emphasis on the true meaning of the tenns dehooration and premeditation. Aa stated
in People v. Be'fUler, ?:I Cal2d 164, 185 [163 P.2d 8]:
" .•. While the jury may be told that the brain can function
rapidly they must not be misled into thinking that an act ean
at the same time be hasty, hurried, and deliberate, or impulsive, unstudied, and premeditated. The extent of the rellection in every ease, if it is to pass the test, must fairly and
reasonably meet the ordinary and unquestioned significations
of the test words. It is irrefragable that (in cases of the type
now before us) the statutes of California purport to authorize
putting a person to his death only where his act of killin:?
was truly deliberate and premeditated; i. e., was murder of
the 1lrst degree."
From defendant's confession and the absence of any other
evidence of motive it would seem that the murder was the
result of his confused association of his rancor against his
ex-wife with all women, 80 that in giving vent to his intense
desire to kill his ex-wife, he stabbed Mrs. Fouts. There was
apparently nothing to break this confused conception during
defendant's prolonged spree of brooding, drinking, and visiting with Mrs. Fouts. It is true that the evidence, if submitted
to the jury under proper instructions, would have supported
a verdict of murder of the first degree, but under that evidence it would also have been possible for the jury to conclude that the murder was of a lesser degree in that, since
defendant had seen and been introduced to Mrs. Fouts for
the first time only a few hours before the killing, apparently
the intent to substitute her as a victim in place of the ex-wife,
was not arrived at as the result of a dispassionate, cool, and
deliberate premeditation, but was the result of~ an impulse
engendered during the short period the two were together.
In short, had the jurors been properly instructed, they might
or might not have concluded that the killing was "willful,
deliberate, and premeditated," as those terms are used in the
statute defining murder of the first degree (Pen. Code, § 189).
A lesser verdict returned by them could not have been disturbed.
.~
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The jurors should have been told in substanee that "Neither
the statute nor the court undertakes to measure in units of
time the length of the period during whieh the thought must
be pondered before it can ripen into an intent whieh is truly
deliberate and premeditated. The time would vary with different individuals and under dift'ering eireumstanees. The
true test is not the duration of time as mueh as it is the extent
of the reflection. Thoughts may fonow eaeh other with great
rapidity and eold, ealculated judgment may be arrived at
quiekly, but the express requirement for a concurrenee of
deliberation and premeditation excludes from murder of the
1irRt degree those homicides (not specificany enumerated in
the statute) which are the result of mere unconsidered or :
rash impulse hastily exeeuted." (People v. Bender, 27 Cal.
2<1, BUprll, 184-185: People v. Thomas, 25 Cal.2<1 880, 900
[156 P.2d 7].)
It marks no innovation in the law to state that even where
there is undisputed evidence of first degree murder, convincing in the eyes of an appellate court, erroneous instructions
which bear vitally upon the proper definition of the crime,
must be deemed to have been prejudicial. Such has always
been the law of this state. Thus it is said in People v. VllleneiG (1872), 43 Cal. 552, at p. 556: "We are not justified in
saying that the error [an instruetion omitting from the definition of murder in the first degree the essential qualities of
deliberation and premeditation] was productive of no injury
to the defendants, because we may be satisfied that the jury
ought to have found from the evidence, as they did, that the
defendants are guilty of murder in the first degree. The
question as to the deliberation and premeditation of the defendants is one whieh is peculiarly the province of the jury
to determine; and should we sustain the eharge of the Court,
because of the apparently satisfactory character of the evidence, that question would virtually be withdrawn from the
jury."
Again it was said in People v. Chew Sing Wing (1891),
88 Cal. 268, at page 270 [25 P. 1099]: "There is no question
arising in a trial for murder more peculiarly or purely one
of fact than the one whether the killing was done with deh1>eration and premeditation, or in the decision of which 80 much
is necessarily left to the sound sense, discretion, and experience
of the jury, who, under the constitution, are made the exclusive triers of that issue. In People v. Ah Lee, 60 Cal. 86,
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this court said: 'And we think it to be well settled in this
state that it was error to instruct the jury that there were
no circumstances in the ease to reduce the offense below that
of murder in the first degree. The question whether the killing was perpetrated with the deliberation and premeditation
necessary to constitute it murder in the first degree was one
which it waR "peculiarly the province of the jury to determine" '_ . _ . Nor can this court weigh the testimony for the
purpose of determining whether the verdict of the jury is not
right upon the evidence quoting from People v. Valencia,
supra]."
Here the court did not submit to the jury any issue of fact
whatsoever on the question of degree; not even in the erroneous instructions as to what would constitute premeditation
and deliberation were the jurors permitted to determine any
issue of fact. They were told that if there existed in the
mind of the defendant at the time of the slaying "the specific intent to take life" then the offense "would of course
be murder of the first degree." Defendant, by his own admission, conceded the existence of such specific intent. That
fact never was questioned by the defendant. Hence the instruction that if that specific intent existed the offense "would
of course be murder of the first degree," left the jury no
posr;;ible alternative, unless they directly disobeyed that in·
struction, but to return a verdict of murder of the first degree.
In this ease, therefore, there was not merely error in instructions, but a total failure, in c1fect, to aecord the defend·
ant a trial by jury.
For the foregoing reasons I would reverse the judgment.

r

Schauer, J., concurred.
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TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent.
I do not agree that "the jury could not properly have arrived at any verdict other than a verdict finding defendant
guilty of murder of the first degree!' In my opinion the
jury could properly have arrived at a different verdict, and
it is not improbable that it would have done so had it been
correctly instructed with respect to premeditation. The jury
might reasonably have concluded that because of the confused state of defendant's mind he did not act with premeditation.

